Extensive in scope and drawing on newly available evidence from multinational archives, this book reconsiders Sino-Indian border issues during the middle Cold War using multiple established analytical frameworks. It demonstrates how key countries perceived and engaged with the border conflict by aiding the two main participants morally and materially. Before, during, and after the 1962 Sino-Indian border war, multinational political actors pursued their foreign policy goals (e.g., trade, security, and prestige) concerning the frontier, and often tried to destabilize spheres of influence and bolster alliances. Therefore, this contest signified a variation of the Anglo-Russian Great Game in Asia during the nineteenth century, and the theater of operations encompassed not only the border itself, but also the Himalayan kingdoms, Tibet, and Burma. A reevaluation of the border conflict between India and China is necessary given current, ongoing clashes at their still unresolved border as well as the fact that these two countries now possess enhanced technology and weapons.

Reed H. Chervin researches Asia and the world. He received his PhD in International History from the University of Hong Kong in 2019 and has published in the Journal of Cold War Studies and the Journal of American-East Asian Relations.

Acknowledgments
List of Figures
Note on Chinese Romanization and Translations
Introduction
Part I: The 1962 War
Chapter 1 - The 1962 War and Domestic Reactions in China and India
Chapter 2 - Immediate International Fallout
Part II: Antebellum
Chapter 3 - Chinese Views and Policies Toward the Southern Frontier, 1950-1962
Chapter 4 - Indian Views and Policies Toward the Northern Frontier, 1950-1962
Chapter 5 -Views and Policies of the Anglophone West Toward the Sino-Indian Frontier, 1950-1962
Part III: Postbellum
Chapter 6 - Chinese Post-War Overtures Abroad, 1962-1970
Chapter 7 - India’s “New” Frontier Policies and Foreign Assistance, 1962-1970
Chapter 8 - Western Policies Toward South and Southeast Asia, plus Pakistan’s Response, 1962-1970
Conclusions
Selected Bibliography
Index