From the Republican Party's "Southern Strategy" in the U.S. to the rise of Le Pen's National Front in France, conservative politicians in the last thirty years have capitalized on voters' resentment of ethnic minorities to win votes and undermine government aid to the poor. In this book, the authors construct a theoretical model to calculate the effect of voters' attitudes about race and immigration on political parties' stances on income distribution.

Drawing on empirical data from the U.S., Britain, Denmark, and France, they use their model to show how parties choose their platforms and compete for votes. They find that the Right is able to push fiscal policies that hurt working and middle class citizens by attracting voters who may be liberal on economic issues but who hold conservative views on race or immigration. The authors estimate that if all voters held non-racist views, liberal and conservative parties alike would have proposed levels of redistribution 10 to 20 percent higher than they did. Combining historical analysis and empirical rigor with major theoretical advances, the book yields fascinating insights into how politicians exploit social issues to advance their economic agenda.

Political cqui]ibrium: Theory and Application     14
21 The Data      14
SCharacterization of PUNE as a System of Equations  17
2.3  The Probability-of-Victorv Function 2:
2.1  Factional Bargaining Powers  22
2.5  The Three-Party Model
2.6  First Application: The Logarithmic Utility Function
.7   Sccond Application: The Euclidean Utility Function
2.8  Conclusion
3   History of Racial Politics in the United States  41
31  Ihntroducrion   4
3,2  Race and American Exceptionalism   44
3 3  issue Evolution   46
3.4  The Dixiecrats    9
3,  CThe Presidential Election of 1964 and its Aftermath  _6
.6   lihe Reagan Democrats   6l
3.7  Race, Class, and Welfare Reform in the 1990s  64
38   Conclusion    66
4   United States: Quantitative Analysis   68
4.J Introduction    68
4.2  Recovering Voter Racism from Survey Data  69
43   Estimation of the Model's Parameters  92
4.4  Numerical Solution of the Log Utility Model  113
4.5  The Euclidean Function Approach  123
4.6  Conclusion   127
5   History of Racism and Xenophobia min  e United Kingdom      130
5.1 Introduction    130
5.2 Immigration in Britain  135
5.3  An Issue of"High Potential"  138
5.4  From Powel to Thatcher: Challenging the Consensus  148
5.5  The Rise of Thatcher and the Breakdown of the
Consensus of Silence  753
5.6 Immigration in the 1990s and Beyond  159
5.7  Conclusion    164
6    United Kingdom: Quantitative Analysis    166
61 Inntroduction    166
62   Minorities, Race, and Class Politics in the UK  168
6.3  Estimation of Parameters  273
6.4  The PBE and ASE: Computation   i80
6.5  Conclusion    190
7  mmigration: A Challenge to Tolerant Denmark     719
7.1 Introduction    191
7.2  The Early Years: Guest iWorkers and Their Famniies  19
"73  The Eighties: The Emergence of Refugees  195
"74  The Nineties: Xenophobia Emerges, Front and Center  97
7.5  No Longer Marginal: The Far Right and the Election of 2001  202
8   Denmark: Quantitative Analysis     205
8.   Parties and Issues  205
8.2  Estimation of the Models Parameters  7I0
8.3  Political Equilibrium: Observation and Prediction  26
8.4  The Policy-Bundle and Antisolidarity Effects: Computation  23
85  Conclusion   235
9 irImmigration and the Political institutionalization of Xenophobia
in France     237
9.1 Introduction    237
9.2  immgration in France: A Brief Sketch  238
.-  The Politicization of Immigration  243
94   The Rise of Le Pen  246
935  The Mainstreaming of Xenophobia    -1
9.0  The 1988 Presidential Election  250
9.   Xenophobia Remains in the Headlines  22
9.8  Conventional Politics Return as a New Cleavage Is Born  25
9.9  Conciusion    263
10  Francle Quiantitative Analysis   265
10.1  Parties and Voter Opinion  265
112   Political Equilibrium with Three Parties  268
10.3  Estimation of Mode Parameters   273
10.4  Political Equilibrium: Observation and Prediction  289
i0. 5  The Policy-Bundle and Antisolidarity Effects: Computation  30
1 . Conclusion     j3
Il.1 The Rise of the New Right Movement    3-0
11.2  Recapitulation 1  08
i1.3  The Log Uility Function Approach   312
L1.4  The Euclidean Utility Function Approach  3' 4
11.3  Limitations  ,31
S116  Final Remark    320