List of Illustrations
Preface
Acknowledgments
Introduction: Exploring the Boundary between Politics and Science
1: Social Interests in Promoting and Controlling Science and Technology
1.1: Expansion of Government Support for Science, 1945 to the Late 1960s: The United States
1.2: Expansion of Government Support for Science, 1945 to the Late 1960s: The United Kingdom
1.3: Reassessing Science and Technology, 1965-1975
1.4: Deregulation and Selective Growth: 1970s and 1980s
1.5: The Shaping of American and British Science Policy
2: The Social Transformation of Recombinant DNA Technology, 1972-1982
2.1: Anticipations of Genetic Engineering, 1952-1970
2.2: The First Gene-Splicing Experiments, 1969-1973
2.3: Visions of a Commercial Future, 1974-1976
2.4: Genetic Engineering Enters the Business Arena, 1976-1979
2.5: The "Cloning Gold Rush," 1979-1982
2.6: A New Commercial Ethos
2.7: A Transformation of Interest
3: The Emergence and Definition of the Genetic Engineering Issue, 1972-1975
3.2: Social Interests in Genetic Engineering
3.3: Precedents
3.4: Emergence of the Recombinant DNA Issue, 1973-1974
3.5: Initiating Recombinant DNA Policy in the United States and the United Kingdom, 1972-1976
3.6: The Asilomar Conference, 24-27 February 1975
3.7: The Asilomar Legacy
4: Initiating Government Controls in the United States and the United Kingdom, 1975-1976
4.1: The Politics of the NIH Guidelines
4.2: Forming the NIH Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee
4.3: Developing the NIH Guidelines, 1975-1976
4.4: The Hearing before the Director's Advisory Committee, February 1976
4.5: Promulgating the 1976 NIH Guidelines: Industry and the Public Enter the Policy Debate
4.6: The Politics of Genetic Engineering in the United Kingdom
4.7: The Williams Committee and the Formation of British Policy
4.8: Forming the Genetic Manipulation Advisory Group
4.9: The American and British Policy Paradigms: Variations on the Asilomar Legacy
5: Defusing the Controversy: The Politics of Risk Assessment
5.1: The Spread of the Recombinant DNA Controversy
5.2: The Hazard Problem: A Case Study in the Closure of a Technical Controversy
5.3: The Meetings at Bethesda, Falmouth, and Ascot
5.4: Further Sources of "New Evidence"
5.5: The Politics of Risk Assessment
5.6: Dissemination/Legitimation
6: Derailing Legislation, 1977-1978
6.1: The Politics of Government Control of Recombinant DNA Technology
6.2: Biomedical Research as an "Affected Industry"
6.3: The Rise and Fall of Recombinant DNA Legislation
6.4: The Political Impact of the Legislative Defeat
7: Revising the National Institutes of Health Controls, 1977-1978
7.1: The Social and Political Setting
7.2: Revisions Proposed, 1977
7.3: The Director's Advisory Committee Meeting, December 1977
7.4: The Position of Private Industry, December 1977
7.5: Cloning Viral DNA: The Original Problem Reassessed
7.6: Making the Changes: Initiating a Policy Reversal
7.7: Revisions Released, December 1978
8: Operating the Genetic Manipulation Advisory Group, 1977-1978
8.1: The Social and Political Setting
8.2: The Politics of GMAG
8.3: Implementing the Williams Proposals, 1977
8.4: Developing the Brenner Scheme, 1977-1978
9: Dismantling the National Institutes of Health Controls: From Prevention to Crisis Intervention, 1979
9.1: The Social and Political Setting
9.2: Industry, Academe, and the Politics of the NIH Controls
9.3: The Status of the Hazards Debate
9.4: The Wye Meeting
9.5: The New Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee
9.6: The Rowe-Campbell Proposal: The First Move toward Dismantling the NIH Controls
9.7: A Turn in Discourse and Policy
10: Dismantling the National Institutes of Health Controls but Preserving Quasi-regulation, 1980-