Cover
Table of Contents
Tables
List of Abbreviations
Acknowledgments
1. The Puzzle of Chinese Sanctions
1.1 Arguments and implications
1.2 Chapter overview
2.1 Thinking about sanctions
2.1.1 Coercive sanctions
2.1.2 Constraining sanctions
2.1.3 Signalling sanctions
Table 2.1 Sanctions Spectrum and the Expected Material Impact of Sanctions on Target States
2.2.2 Explanation 2: The Chinese leadership was constrained by its domestic actors
2.2.3 Explanation 3: China’s participation in the WTO shaped its sanctions behaviour
2.2.4 Explanation 4: History and culture shaped China’s sanctions behaviour
2.3 Conclusion
International Audience Costs and China’s Sanctions Behaviour
3.1.1 On audience costs
3.1.2 What are ‘international audience costs’ and why do they matter?
3.1.3 Condition 1: The offender needs to be concerned about international opinion
3.1.4 Condition 2: There must be at least one rhetorical actor present
Figure 3.1 Effects of Rhetorical Action on Behaviour and the Triggering of International Audience Costs
Table 3.1 Rhetorical Tools and Their Impact on International Attention
3.2.1 China’s quest for recognition and higher international status
3.2.2 Sanctions rhetoric as China’s counter-stigmatisation strategy
Figure 3.2 Effects of International Audience Costs and Rhetorical Action on China’s Sanctions Behaviour
Table 3.2 The Five Competing Hypotheses
4. Stigmatising Sanctions and China’s Counter-Stigmatisation
4.1.1 Defining stigma and stigmatising sanctions
4.1.2 Stigma management strategies and their implications
4.1.3 China and stigmatising sanctions
Table 4.1 Stigma Management Strategies and Their Implications
4.2.1 The inception of sanctions against China, 1949-1971
4.2.2 Motivations behind US sanctions against China
4.2.3 China’s response to Cold War sanctions
4.2.4 China’s admission to the UN
4.2.5 The road to China’s UN admission
4.2.6 China’s reaction to its UN admission
4.2.7 The lifting of Cold War sanctions and beginning of US-led sanctions after the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident
4.2.8 The extent of post-Tiananmen sanctions, 1989-1993
4.2.9 China’s response to the Tiananmen sanctions
4.2.10 Post-Tiananmen debates, 1993 onwards
4.3 China’s counter-stigmatisation: its sanctions frame at the UNSC, 1997-2016
4.3.1 Method of analysis
4.3.2 China’s stated standards of sanctions legitimacy at the UNSC, 1997-2016
Table 4.2 China’s Arguments on Sanctions-Related Resolutions at the UNSC, 1997-2016
Table 4.3 China’s Stated Standards of Sanctions Legitimacy at the UNSC
5. China and United Nations Security Council Sanctions
5.1 China and UNSC sanctions: correlation analysis and case study selection
5.1.1 Correlation analysis: methodology
5.1.2 Correlation analysis: the relevance of the rhetoric-based hypothesis
Table 5.1 Results of Correlation Analysis Regarding China’s Interests, Rhetoric, and Sanctions Voting
5.1.3 Selection of case studies
Table 5.2 The 34 Consolidated Sanctions Resolution Cases Categorised According to Their Apparent Alignment with the Rhetoric-based Hypothesis
5.1.4 China and sanctions: five competing hypotheses
5.2.1 Background of UNSC sanctions against the DPRK
5.2.2 Competing explanations concerning China’s behaviour towards DPRK sanctions
5.2.3 Playing up China’s non-proliferation commitments: the US as a rhetorical actor
5.2.4 Conclusion of the DPRK case
5.3.1 Background of proposed UNSC sanctions against Syria
5.3.2 Competing explanations for China’s behaviour towards sanctions against Syria
5.3.3 Explaining China’s behaviour: discourse on human rights, intervention, and the Libya effect
5.3.4 Conclusion of the Syrian case
5.4.1 Background of the Guinea-Bissau case
5.4.2 Competing explanations for China’s behaviour towards sanctions against Guinea-Bissau
5.4.3 Explaining China’s voting behaviour towards Guinea-Bissau sanctions: the lack of a rhetorical actor
5.4.4 Conclusion of the Guinea-Bissau case
Table 5.3 Comparison of Assessed Level of Effectiveness for Each Competing Hypothesis (H1-5)
6. China’s Unilateral Sanctions: Eight Classic Cases Revisited
6.1 China’s use (or non-use) of unilateral sanctions in the eight classic cases
6.1.1 China-France dispute over French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s meeting with the Dalai Lama
Table 6.1 Trend of EU-China Trade, 2007-2016
6.1.2 China-US dispute over arms sales to Taiwan
6.1.3 China-Japan dispute over a trawler collision in mutually claimed waters
6.1.4 China-Norway dispute over the Nobel Peace Prize award to Liu Xiaobo
6.1.5 China-Philippines dispute over the Scarborough Shoal
Table 6.2 Mindanao’s Export of Banana-Related Products to China, 2011-2015
Table 6.3 Chinese Visitors to the Philippines, January-December 2012
6.1.6 China-Vietnam dispute over an oil rig
Figure 6.1 Vietnam’s Trade with China, 2000-2014
6.1.7 China-Taiwan dispute over the newly elected Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen’s refusal to explicitly endorse the ‘1992 Consensus’
6.1.8 China-South Korea dispute over the deployment of the US THAAD system
Table 6.4 South Korea’s Top Trading Partners, 2017
6.2 Evidence from the eight classic cases: summary and interpretation
Table 6.5 Extent of Sanctions Imposed by China in the Eight Classic Cases, 2008-2018
7. Demystifying China’s Sanctions Behaviour
7.1.1 China was not yet powerful enough to employ unilateral sanctions effectively
Figure 7.1 Vietnam’s Trade with China and its Other Major Partners, January – June 2014
7.1.2 The Chinese leadership was constrained by its domestic actors
7.1.3 China’s participation in the World Trade Organization (WTO) shaped its sanctions behaviour
7.1.4 History and culture shaped China’s sanctions behaviour, leading Chinese leaders to prefer inducement over coercion
7.1.5 China’s sanctions rhetoric constrained its behaviour
Table 7.1 Summary and Extent of Alignment across Categories of China’s Use of Economic, Political, and Military Pressure in the Eight Classic Cases
7.1.6 Limitations of the rhetoric-based hypothesis
7.2 Lessons from the ‘eight classic cases’
8. China’s Sanctions Dilemma
8.1 Policy and theoretical implications
8.2 The future of China’s sanctions rhetoric and behaviour
8.3 Areas for further study
United Nations Security Council Meeting Records:
Coverage of Speeches by Chinese Representatives, 1997-2016
Complete List of Proposed United Nations Security Council Sanctions-Related Resolutions, 1971-2016
China’s Material Interests with Targeted Sanctions Regimes
Bibliography
Index