Cover
Title Page
Copyright
Dedication
Contents
Introduction: A Negative Observation and a
Positive Conjecture
Part I. A First Instance of the Negative Observation: Justifying the State
1.1 Claims
1.2 Interests in Improvement
1.3 Fair Trade-Offs
1.4 Chances
1.5 Choice Situations
1.6 Rights against Invasion
1.7 Appendix: Natural Injustice, Structural Injustice,
and Claims against No One
2.1 The Ubiquitous Presupposition: A Claim against the State
2.2 Enforcement
2.3 The Distributive Complaint
2.4 The Deontological Complaint
2.5 The Myth of the Omittites
2.6 The Natural Duty Argument
2.7 The Avoidance Principle
2.8 Avoiding State Imposition
2.9 Two Libertarian Principles
3.1 The Myth of Our Trusting Future
3.2 Conditioning and Announcing
3.3 Two Contrasts between Force and Threat
3.4 From the Inheritance Principle to the Risk and
Fear Principles
3.5 The Choice Principle
3.6 Coercion, Strictly Speaking
3.7 Exploitative Offers
4.1 Is the Claim against Being Obligated to Obey the State?
4.2 Is the Claim against the State’s Expropriation?
Part II. The Positive Conjecture: Claims against Inferiority
Chapter 5. Relations of Inferiority
5.1 Three Abstract Conditions, Two Paradigms
5.2 Power, Authority, and Regard
5.3 Is Objectionable Hierarchy Just Disparity of Regard?
5.4 The Primary Tempering Factors
5.5 The Structure of Claims against Inferiority
6.1 Regard in General
6.2 Esteem for Particular Qualities and Achievements
6.3 Consideration for Persons
6.4 Purely Expressive Disparities
7.1 Expression
7.2 Psychic Cost
7.3 Recognition
8.1 A Claim against the Hierarchy of the State
8.2 Secondary Tempering Factors
8.3 Inferiority or Heteronomy: Self-Sovereignty as
a Case Study
8.4 Impersonal Justification and Least Discretion
8.5 Equal Application
8.6 Downward Accountability and Upward Unaccountability
8.7 Equal Influence
8.8 Ruling and Being Ruled in Turn
8.9 Equal Consideration and Equal Citizenship
9.1 Reviving the Parallel-Case Argument
9.2 The Firm and the Primary Tempering Factors
9.3 Impersonal Justification and Least Discretion in
the Firm
9.4 A Case for Workplace Democracy?
Chapter 10. Collective Inferiority
Part III. Further Instances
Chapter 11. Claims against Corruption: The Negative Observation
11.1 The Duty to Execute
11.2 Must Corruption Disserve the Public Interest?
11.3 Unjust Enrichment
11.4 The Duty to Exclude
12.1 Impersonal Justification Explains the Duty to Execute
12.2 Least Discretion Explains the Duty to Exclude
12.3 Exploitative Offers as Violations of the Duty to Exclude
12.4 Corruption without Inequality?
13.1 Claims against Discrimination: The Negative Observation
13.2 Claims against Discrimination: The Positive Conjecture
Chapter 14. Claims to Equal Treatment
14.1 Claims to Equal Treatment: The Negative Observation
14.2 Claims to Equal Treatment by the State:
The Positive Conjecture
14.3 Claims to Equal Treatment by Officials:
The Positive Conjecture
Chapter 15. Claims to the Rule of Law
16.1 The Puzzle of Rawls’s Egalitarianism
16.2 Equal Basic Liberty: The Negative Observation
16.3 Equal Basic Liberty: The Positive Conjecture
17.1 Formal Equality of Opportunity
17.2 Substantive Equality of Opportunity
Chapter 18. Claims against Poverty, Relative and Absolute
Chapter 19. Claims against Illiberal Interventions: The Negative Observation
19.1 Illiberal Interventions
19.2 Cost Effects
19.3 Value-of-Compliance Effects
19.4 Responsibility
19.5 Public Justification
19.6 Paternalism, Strictly Speaking
20.1 Condemnation of Choice as a Disparity of Consideration
20.2 Rawls on Unequal Liberty
20.3 Self-Sovereignty
Part IV. Contrasts
Chapter 21. Being No Worse Off
21.1 Cosmic Fairness
21.2 Solidarity, Fraternity, Community
Chapter 22. Relations of Equality
23.1 Domination and Inferiority
23.2 Domination and Encroachment
23.3 The Inescapability of Domination
23.4 Does Republican Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?
Part V. A Last Instance: Democracy
Chapter 24. Preliminaries
24.1 Defining the Terms
24.2 Three Interests in Democratic Decision-Making
24.3 Substantive Interests
24.4 Resolving Disagreement
25.1 Securing Acceptance
25.2 Satisfying Preferences
25.3 Two Interpretations of Arrow’s Theorem
26.1 Absolute Decisiveness or Control
26.2 Positive Influence as a Means to
Political Activity
26.3 Must Means to Political Activity Be Equal?
26.4 Must We Lend Ourselves to Political Activity?
26.5 The Expressive Significance of Relative Influence
27.1 Equal Influence
27.2 Equal, Not Positive, Opportunity
27.3 Explaining Authority and Legitimacy
27.4 Is Representation Compatible with Equal Influence?
27.5 Bankers and Judges
27.6 Selection Conditions: Election over Sortition
27.7 Conduct Conditions: Collective Decisions,
Not Aggregated Preferences
VI. A Democracy Too Lenient and Too Demanding?
28.1 The Ills
28.2 Beyond Results
28.3 Beyond Responsive Policy
29.1 A Priori Equality
29.2 Majority Rule
29.3 Equal Populations
29.4 Proportional Representation
29.5 Persistent Minorities
30.1 Defining “Gerrymandering”
30.2 Results
30.3 Responsiveness
30.4 Equal Influence and A Priori Equality
30.5 Two-Party Proportionality
30.6 Majority Proportionality
30.7 Racial Gerrymandering and Discrimination
30.8 Equal Influence and Asymmetric Information
30.9 Corruption
30.10 Frequency of Elections
31.1 Money and Time
31.2 Judgment Dependence
31.3 The Diversity of Objections to Money in Politics
31.4 Information and Organization
32.1 The Case against the Folk Theory
32.2 Why Arbitrary Voting Matters
32.3 Is Voting Arbitrary?
Conclusion: Not So Much Liberty As Noninferiority
Notes
References
Acknowledgments
Index